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Abstract: John von Neumann’s transformation from a logician of quantum mechanics (QM) in the 1920s
to a natural philosopher of computation in the 1950s is discussed. The paper argues for revision of the
historical image of Neumann to portray his change to an anti formalist philosopher of computation.
Neumann abandoned Hilbert’s programme that knowledge could be expressed as logical predicates. The
change is described by relating Neumann’s criticism of Carnap’s logicism and by discussing Neumann’s
rejection of the Turing Machine model of computation. Probably under the influence of the founders of
modern physics in particular Wolfgang Pauli and Werner Heisenberg at the Advanced Study Institute,
Neumann changed to a natural philosopher of computation. Neumann’s writings from his development of
the now almost universal von Neumann computer architecture are discussed to show his 1950s view of
algorithms as physicalized entities. The paper concludes by quoting Neumann’s statements criticizing
mechanistic evolution and criticizing neural networks.
Keywords: John von Neumann, Von Neumann computer architecture, Philosophy of computation, Hilbert’s
programme, Turing Machine computation model, MRAM computation model, Rudolf Carnap, Anti
formalism, Natural philosophy, Bohr’s complementarity, P?=NP problem.
1. Introduction
John von Neumann’s transformation from a logician of quantum mechanics (QM) in the
1920s to a natural philosopher of computation in the 1950s is best expressed by a story Neumann
told about Wolfgang Pauli’s criticism of formal mathematics. "If a mathematical proof is what
matters in physics, you would be a great physicist." (Thirring[2001], p. 5). Neumann’s
transitioned from adherent of David Hilbert’s programme that all knowledge could be
axiomatized as predicate formulas in the 1920s to the first computer scientist is described. The
von Neumann computer architecture (Aspray[1990]) anticipated current theoretical models of
computation. Neumann also criticized formal automata and machine learning.
This paper argues that the wide spread popularity of computers and artificial intelligence
has resulted in suppression of Neumann history. I argue that there is a need for much more
detailed historical study of Neumann. This paper is a first step in the historical revision of the
1950s Neumann. In my view, to often the historical image of Neumann only includes his pre
WW II work on formal quantum logic.
Neumann’s transition to philosopher of computation became his dominant passion driving
changes in his other philosophical positions. However, he remained an applied mathematician
publishing earlier work even from the late 1940s and continued to work on problems from applied
mathematics. One example is Neumann’s lecture to the International Congress of Mathematics in
1954 titled "Unsolved problems in Mathematics" (Neumann[1954]). He considered infinitary
problems in Hilbert spaces while mentioning that they did not correspond to physical reality (p.
241). Other contributions of the later Neumann such as his contribution to computer patents is
not discussed because it requires legal expertise. Neumann’s contribution to econometrics is not
discussed.
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2. Background
Kurt Godel’s incompleteness results in the late 1920s (Godel[1931]) and discussions with
physicists in the 1930s were some factors motivating Neumann’s change. Neumann’s transition is
best expressed by his strong criticism of Carnap’s predicate formula based conception of
information (Kohler[2001]). The paper discusses Neumann’s criticism of Carnap and argues that
Kohler’s explanation of the reasons for the rejection of Hilbert’s programme is incorrect because
in the 1950s while working with physicists at the Advanced Study Institute, Neumann rejected
predicate formula based knowledge. The von Neumann computer architecture explicitly
improves the Turing Machine model (TM).
3. Neumann Study of Natural Philosophy
Natural philosophy studies physical reality. Before the development of modern physics,
there was no need for natural philosophy because Newtonian physics described a fixed and causal
world in terms of Newton’s laws. Max Planck and Albert Einstein called themselves natural
philosophers because their study of physics involved studying philosophical concepts and
scientific methods. It was clear in the late 19th century that Newtonian physics was inadequate in
some areas. The new modern physics redefined philosophical concepts such as causality and
simultaneity and modified empirical studies to include methodological study of experiments
(Heisenberg[1958] Chapter 6 for a more detailed description of this change).
The philosophical changes in physics remain the subject of debate. One important debate
related to computation involves search for one unified physical theory that was probably due to
Einstein. Heisenberg provided a modern explanation of unified physical theories unified by
mathematical groups (Heisenberg[1958], pp. 105-107). In contrast, David Bohm held the view
view that nature is an infinity of different qualitative realities (Bohm[1957]).
John von Neumann undertook the study of natural philosophy as part of his development of
the modern digital computer starting in the early 1940s. Neumann was influenced by the
founders of modern physics and physicists were influenced by Neumann in their concepts and
methods used in calculating field properties. Neumann’s natural philosophy of computation is
usually studied in the computer science (CS) area as operations research. In contrast to
Neumann’s view, the other CS research programme is based on mathematical logic often
expressed as the Church Turing Thesis. Logic based CS is now predominant.
4. Neumann’s Criticism of Carnap’s Conception of Information Shows Change
Eckehart Kohler in his excellent and detailed paper "Why von Neumann rejected Carnap’s
Dualism of Information Concepts" (Kohler[2001]) argues that Neumann’s (and Pauli’s) very
harsh criticism of Carnap was incorrect because Neumann wrongly assumed information only has
physical meaning. Both Neumann and Pauli were so sure of their criticism that they
recommended Carnap not publish his study of information. Neumann’s criticism shows his
changed views concerning logic and empiricism.
Neumann’s opposition to Carnap’s argument that information has a formal logical
component as well as an experimental physical component provides the clearest explication of his
changed philosophy. Kohler’s mistake is that starting after world II physicists and applied
mathematicians including Neumann rejected the very idea that formal sentence based logic can
describe reality. Their criticism was not that Godel’s results (Godel[1931]) made formula based
propositional logic no longer absolute, but that logic failed as a method for describing the world.
By the early 1950s Neumann viewed the world as empirical for which growth of
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knowledge required experiments. I interpret Kohler and Carnap as arguing that Hilbert’s
programme could still work in conjunction with the dual idea that information has both a logical
element and an empirical element (p. 117). Both Carnap and Kohler are attempting to save
Hilbert’s programme that they problem shift to be interpreted semantically. Kohler characterized
Carnap’s logical component of information as ’logical and mathematical sentences.’ (p. 98) This
is why Neumann attacked Carnap’s dualism.
Neumann’s rejection of his 1920s belief in Hilbert’s programme can be seen from the
advice Neumann gav e Claude Shannon to use the term entropy for one of the functions involved
in Shannon’s definition of information in spite of Shannon’s misgivings (p. 105). The advice was
given around 1949 before Neumann’s anti formalist views were fully developed, but shows
Neumann’s shift to empiricism. Shannon avoided the issue of the meaning of information by
explaining it as simply a type of mathematical coding function.
The background change to anti-formalism did not just occur at the Institute of Advanced
Study in Princeton, but was common among physicists and applied mathematicians after WWII.
Formal propositional logic was viewed as problematic not only because systems of formal
sentences could be used to mechanically derive inconsistent results (Godel1931], see also Paul
Finsler’s earlier results that were not tied to Russell’s propositional calculus. Finsler[1996],
Breger[1992]), but also because it was believed that knowledge not derivable from formal
systems (from axioms plus formal propositions) exists. One obvious example that can not be
understood in terms of formal mathematics is instantaneous wav e function collapse in quantum
mechanics.
After Neumann’s death in the 1960s, empirical alternatives to logicism were developed.
Finsler proved that the continuum hypothesis is true by defining a continuum that was
axiomatically defined, but different from the standard continuum definition (Finsler[1968]).
Einstein expressed earlier the viewpoint of the founders of modern physics in his 1921 lecture on
geometry and experience (Einstein[1921]). Einstein argued that formal mathematics
(propositional logic based rationality) was incomplete in a physical sense. However, Einstein
expressed a contrary view in other writing. George Polya who was Neumann’s teacher
encouraged Imre Lakatos to solidify the ideas expressed by Neumann and Wolfgang Pauli that
possibly actually originated with Polya. The idea in the 1960s was called quasi-empirical
mathematics. Polya encouraged Lakatos to rewrite his thesis Proofs and Refutations. as a simpler
book because it would solidify empirical mathematics in place of logicism (Polya[1975]).
5. Neumann Conception of Computation Closest to MRAM Model
Starting in the early 1940s, Neumann became focused on the possibilities of digital
computers (Aspray[1990] for a detailed history). There is currently no evidence of Neumann’s
explicit discussion of his philosophy of computation. However, it is known that Neumann
discussed his thinking about abstract properties a computer architecture should have and
discussed problems with neural networks as models for computation. Neumann rejected that TM
model because it used logics rather than physical properties (Kohler[2001], p. 104). Kohler
explains Neumann’s view of logic (algorithms) as physicalized entities (p. 116). Neumann’s
explicit rejection of formal neural networks also sheds light on his computational philosophy
(Aspray[1990], note 94, p. 321).
In the early 1950s, the possibility was considered that computational errors in constructed
computers were physically inherent conceptually similar to entropy. Since Neumann worked with
Wolfgang Pauli and Werner Heisenberg who developed the Bohr interpretation of QM, the early
view of errors may have expressed their view of Bohr’s complementarity. It turned out the errors
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were circuit design mistakes and environment background caused errors that were repairable
using error correcting codes.
However, the problem of inherent computational errors has recently re-emerged as errors in
quantum computers. The errors (complementarity between classical macro physics and quantum
micro physics) may actually represent new physical reality that can be measured with the new
methods of cold atom physics (Monroe[2018]). It is possible that Neumann working with Pauli
and Heisenberg anticipated quantum computing. I think Arthur Fine’s characterization of
complementarity as only a conceptual device is incorrect (Fine[1996], pp. 20, 21, 124).
This paper provides an analysis of Neumann’s thinking by discussing a formalization of the
Neumann computer architecture using a modern abstract model called MRAMs (random access
machines with unbounded cell size and unit time multiply) first studied by Hartmanis and Simon
(Hartmanis[1974][1974a]). MRAM’s are the closest studied model to the Neumann computer
architecture. Neumann explicitly listed the MRAM model properties in his list of requirements
for his now almost universally used von Neumann computer architecture.
In contrast to TMs that have an unbounded number of bounded size unary representing
memory cells, Neumann assumed that a computer would have a finite number of binary encoded
unbounded size memory cells (computers need to be built large enough for the given problem).
Neumann also argued that some sort of intuition needed to be built into programs instead of brute
force searching (Aspray[1990], p. 62). Unlike TMs, Neumann’s computer design provides bit
selects and indexing.
6. Consequences of Lack of Study of Neumann’s 1950s Change
There are modern consequences of Neumann’s philosophy and indirectly lack of study of
the 1950s Neumann. In the MRAM model, the P?=NP problem does not exist (or the answer is
that there is no difference between the class of problems solvable by non deterministic guessing
versus the class solvable by deterministic searching) (Meyer[2016]). Many modern philosophical
questions assume implicitly that non deterministic TMs are more powerful than deterministic
machines. For example, Shor’s quantum computation algorithms assume P!=NP (Shor[1996]).
7. Examples of Neumann’s 1950s Thinking
An interesting story related to Neumann’s philosophy is that advocates of the importance of
the P?=NP problem (does guessing speed up computation by more than a polynomial bound)
found a letter in the Godel Archive to Neumann that they interpret as Godel supporting the
importance of the P?=NP problem. However, in a letter (unfortunately undated) from Neumann
to Oswald Veblen relating to an Institute of Advanced Study permanent appointment for Godel,
Neumann shows skepticism toward Godel’s later work (Hartmanis[1989] for the Godel P?=NP
letter. Neumann[2005], p. 276 for the Neumann letter).
To me the most important consequence of Neumann’s transformation is that he correctly
understood that TMs are very weak (slow) computing machines. It is true that TMs are universal
in the Church Turing sense (Copeland[2015]). Any TM or MRAM can calculate anything
recursively computable in the Church Turing sense (for background the question ’are two regular
expressions equivalent’ is outside NP but computable). The thesis is often expressed as any TM
can simulate any computing device. The problem is that Neumann understood the importance of
computational efficiency so TM’s lack of computational power is a negative factor. TMs are
slower than von Neumann computers because the von Neumann architecture’s indexed data
structures obviate the need for non deterministic TM guessing.
Neumann also criticized other models of computation such as primitive automata and
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neural networks. The criticism is based on rejection of the relevance of predicate logic formulas
in describing reality. It is not clear if Neumann rejected the Church Turing thesis. He seems not
to have discussed it. The paper explains this skepticism by analyzing Neumann’s dislike of
Carnap’s philosophy. Here are two specific examples of Neumann’s criticism of automata.
7.1 Criticism of mechanistic evolution
He (Neumann) led the biologist to the window of his study and said: ’Can you see the beautiful white
villa over there on the hill? It arose by pure chance. It took millions of years for the hill to be
formed; trees grew, decayed and grew again, then the wind covered the top of the hill with sand,
stones were probably deposited on it by a volcanic process, and accident decreed that they should
come to lie on top of one another. And so it went on. I know, of course, that accidental processes
through the eons generally produce quite different results. But on this one occasion they led to the
appearance of this country house, and people moved in and live there at this very moment.’ (story
told in Heisenberg[1971] p. 111)
7.2 Low complication levels qualitatively different than high levels
The insight that a formal neuron network can do anything which you can describe in words is a very
important insight and simplifies matters enormously at low complication levels. It is by no means
certain that it is a simplification on high complication levels. It is perfectly possible that on high
complication levels the value of the theorem is in the rev erse direction, namely, that you can express
logics in terms of these efforts and the converse may not be true. (Neumann quoted in Aspray[1990],
note 94, p. 321)
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